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Research Article 
	
How search engines disseminate information about COVID-
19 and why they should do better 
 
Access to accurate and up-to-date information is essential for individual and collective decision making, 
especially at times of emergency. On February 26, 2020, two weeks before the World Health Organization 
(WHO) officially declared the COVID-19’s emergency a “pandemic,” we systematically collected and 
analyzed search results for the term “coronavirus” in three languages from six search engines. We found 
that different search engines prioritize specific categories of information sources, such as government-
related websites or alternative media. We also observed that source ranking within the same search 
engine is subjected to randomization, which can result in unequal access to information among users.  
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Research questions 
• How do search engines select and prioritize information related to COVID-19?  
• What is the impact and consequences of the randomization on information ranking and filtering 
mechanisms?  
• How much do the above-mentioned aspects of web search vary depending on the language of 
the query? 
 
Essay summary 
● Using multiple (N=200) virtual agents (i.e., software programs), we examined how information 
about the coronavirus is disseminated on six search engines: Baidu, Bing, DuckDuckGo, Google, 
Yandex, and Yahoo. We scripted a sequence of browsing actions for each agent and then 
tracked these actions under controlled conditions, including time, agent location, and browser 
history. 
● On February 26, 2020, the agents simultaneously entered search queries based on the most 
common term used to refer to the COVID-19 pandemic (i.e., “coronavirus” in English, Russian, 
                                                             
1 A publication of the Shorenstein Center for Media, Politics, and Public Policy, at Harvard University, John F. 
Kennedy School of Government. 
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and Mandarin Chinese) into the six search engines. 
● The analysis of the search results acquired by the agents highlighted unsettling differences in 
the types of information sources prioritized by different engines. We also identified a 
considerable effect of randomization on how sources are ranked within the same search engine. 
● Such discrepancies in search results can misinform the public and limit the rights of citizens to 
make decisions based on reliable and consistent information, which is of particular concern 
during an emergency, such as the COVID-19 pandemic. 
 
Implications  
 
We identified large discrepancies in how different search engines disseminate information about the 
COVID-19 pandemic. Some differences in the results are expected given that search engines personalize 
their services (Hannak et al., 2013), but our study highlights that even non-personalized search results 
differ substantially. For example, we found that some search algorithms potentially prioritize misleading 
sources of information, such as alternative media and social media content in the case of Yandex, while 
others prioritize authoritative sources (e.g., government-related pages), such as in the case of Google. 
The randomization of search results among users of the same search engine is of particular concern. 
We found that the degree of randomization varies between the engines: for some, such as Google and 
Bing, it mostly affects the composition of the “long tail” of search results, such as those below the top 10 
results, while others, such as DuckDuckGo and Yandex, also randomize the top 10 results. Randomization 
ensures that what a user sees is not necessarily what the user chooses to see, and that different users are 
exposed to different information. Through randomization, a user sees what the search engine randomly 
decided that that specific user is allowed to see. Then, in this scenario, access to reliable information is 
simply a matter of luck.  
While randomization can encourage knowledge discovery by diversifying information acquired by 
individuals (Helberger, 2011), it can be detrimental when the society urgently needs to access consistent 
and accurate information – such as during a public health crisis. If we assume that a major driver of 
randomization is the maximization of user engagement by testing different ways of ranking search results 
and choosing the optimal hierarchy of information resources on a specific topic (e.g., the so-called “Google 
Dance” (Battelle, 2005)), then we would be in a situation in which companies’ private interests directly 
interfere with the people’s rights to access accurate and verifiable information.  
The exact functioning of – and justification for – randomization and different source priorities is 
currently unknown. Criticism of algorithmic non-transparency in information distribution is not new 
(Pasquale, 2015; Kemper & Kolkman, 2019; Noble, 2018). However, lack of transparency is particularly 
troublesome in times of emergency when the biases of filtering and ranking mechanisms become a matter 
of public health and national security. Our observations show that search engines retrieve inconsistent 
and sometime misleading results in relation to COVID-19, but it remains unclear what factors contribute 
to these information discrepancies and what principles each engine uses to construct hierarchies of 
knowledge. These issues raise multiple questions, including what is “good” information, who should 
decide on its quality and can these decisions be applied univocally. Most importantly: should search 
engines suspend randomization in times of public emergencies?  
Finding answers to these questions is not easy and will require time and appropriate efforts. One 
starting point to improve search transparency could be to make resources for conducting “algorithmic 
auditing” (that is, analyses of algorithmic performance similar to the one implemented in this study) more 
accessible to the academic community, and the public at large (Mittelstadt, 2016). Currently, there is no 
openly available and scalable infrastructure that can be used to compare the performance of different 
search engine algorithms, as well as their particular features (e.g., randomization). By providing such 
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infrastructure, and making data on the effects of algorithms on information distribution more accessible, 
search engine companies could address the lack of transparency in their algorithmic systems and increase 
trust in that information technologies play in our societies (Foroohar, 2019). 
Another point to consider is the possibility of implementing “user control mechanisms” that can ensure 
that search engine users can tackle algorithmic features (e.g., randomization) interfering with their ability 
to receive information (He, Parra, & Verbert, 2016; Harambam et al., 2019). User-centric approaches can 
vary from clear policies towards source prioritization (e.g., Google’s decision to prioritize government-
related sources on COVID-19, but applied consistently to other search subjects) to an option to opt out 
not only from search personalization, but also its randomization.  
 
Findings 
 
Finding 1: Your search engine determines what you see 
 
We found large discrepancies in the search results (N=~50) between identical agents using different 
search engines (Figure 1). Despite the use of the same search queries, all the metrics showed less than 
25% similarity in search results between the engines, except DuckDuckGo and Yahoo, which shared almost 
50% of their results. In many cases, we observed almost no overlap in the search results (e.g., between 
Google and DuckDuckGo), thus indicating that users receive completely different selections of information 
sources. While differences in source selection are not necessarily a negative aspect, the complete lack of 
common resources between the search engines can result in substantial information discrepancies among 
their users, which is troubling during an emergency. Furthermore, as Finding 3 shows, search engines 
prioritize not just different sources of the same type (e.g., various legacy media outlets) but different types 
of source, which has direct implications for the quality of information that the engines provide. 
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Figure 1. Average similarities (%) in search results for pairs of agents using different search engines. JI represents the Jaccard 
index and RBO stands for the Ranked Biased Overlap. The x-axis shows the average percentage for each of the similarity metrics, 
and the y-axis shows the pairs of search engines that are compared. 
 
The Jaccard index (JI), a metric that measures the share of common results between different agents, 
showed that for most engines, the source overlap occurred in the long tail of results, that is, those beyond 
the top 10 results. In the top 10 results, the overlap was higher only for the Yahoo-Baidu pair; the rest of 
the results comprised largely different sources. These observations were supported by the Ranked Biased 
Overlap (RBO), a metric that considers the ranking of search results. The parameter p determines how 
important the top results are: p 0.8 gives more weight to the few top results, whereas p 0.95 distributes 
the weight more equally between the top ~30 results. Our RBO values suggested that the ranking of the 
long-tail results was usually more consistent between the search engines than the ranking of the top 
search results. 
 
Finding 2: The search results you receive are randomized 
 
We observed substantial differences in the search results received by the identical agents using the same 
search engine and browser (Figure 2). For some search engines, such as Yahoo and Baidu, we found 
substantial consistency in the composition of the general and top 10 results (as indicated by the JI values). 
However, as indicated by their RBO values, the ranking of these results was inconsistent. By contrast, on 
Google and, to a certain degree, Bing, the top 10 results were consistent, whereas the rest of the results 
were less congruent. Finally, in the case of agents using DuckDuckGo in Chrome, the overall selection of 
the results was consistent, but their rankings varied substantially. 
One possible explanation for such randomization is that the search algorithms introduce a certain 
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degree of “serendipity” into the way the results are selected to give different sources an opportunity to 
be seen (Cornett, 2017). A more pragmatic reason for randomization might be that the search engines are 
constantly experimenting with the results to determine which maximize user satisfaction and potentially 
increase profits through search advertisements. Such experimentation seems to be particularly intense in 
the case of unfolding and rapidly changing topics, for which there are no pre-existing knowledge 
hierarchies.  
 
Figure 2. Average similarities (%) in search results for pairs of agents using the same search engine. JI stands for the Jaccard 
index and RBO stands for the Ranked Biased Overlap. The x-axis shows the average percentage for each of the similarity metrics, 
and the y-axis shows the pairs of search engines that are compared. 
 
To test the later assumption, we ran a series of queries that were not related to the COVID-19 pandemic 
but to more established news topics. When we compared the results for “coronavirus” with other 
searches performed by bots (e.g. “US elections”; see Appendix), we observed higher volatility in the 
coronavirus results, which may be due to its novelty and the absence of historical information about user 
preferences. 
Finally, we considered whether the type of browser influences the degree of randomization. For most 
search engines (except DuckDuckGo, where the ranking of results was strongly randomized in Chrome), 
we did not observe major differences between the browsers. These observations may indicate that the 
choice of browser does not have a substantial influence on the selection of results. At the same time, the 
lack of such influence can also be attributed to the recency of the coronavirus case, which translates to a 
lack of historical data based on which algorithms offer a more browser-specific selection of results. 
 
Finding 3. Search engines prioritize different types of sources 
 
We found that the search engines assign different priorities to specific categories of information sources 
in relation to the coronavirus. Our examination of the 20 most frequently occurring search results in 
English (Figure 3) indicated that most engines prioritized sources associated with legacy media (e.g., CNN) 
and healthcare organizations (including public health ones, such as WHO). However, the ratio of these 
sources varies substantially: for Bing, for instance, healthcare-related sources constituted almost half of 
the top 20 results, whereas for Google, Yandex, and Yahoo, they comprised less than one-quarter of the 
top results. By contrast, Yahoo prioritized recent information updates on the coronavirus from legacy 
media, while Google gave preference to government-related websites, such as those of city councils. 
Considering their ability to spread unverified information, these differences in the knowledge 
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hierarchies constructed by the search engines are troubling. For some of the search engines, the top 
search results about the pandemic included social media (e.g., Reddit) or infotainment (e.g., 
HowStuffWorks). Such sources are generally less reliable than official information outlets or quality media. 
Moreover, in the case of Yandex, the top search results included alternative media (e.g., 
https://coronavirusleaks.com/), in which the reliability of information is questionable.  
 
Figure 3. Top 20 results most frequently provided by each engine by category. The y-axis shows the ratio of different 
categories of sources for each engine. 
 
Considering their ability to spread unverified information, these differences in the knowledge 
hierarchies constructed by the search engines are troubling. For some of the search engines, the top 
search results about the pandemic included social media (e.g., Reddit) or infotainment (e.g., 
HowStuffWorks). Such sources are generally less reliable than official information outlets or quality media. 
Moreover, in the case of Yandex, the top search results included alternative media (e.g., 
https://coronavirusleaks.com/), in which the reliability of information is questionable.  
 
Finding 4. The choice of language affects differences between engines 
 
Finally, we found that the degree of discrepancies between the search results varied depending on the 
language in which the queries were executed. The variation was relatively low among the agents using 
the same search engine, suggesting that the choice of language did not have a substantial influence on 
randomization (except for Google, where results in Chinese/Russian were more randomized than those 
in English). 
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Figure 4. Average similarities (%) for paired agents according to search engines across languages. JI stands for the Jaccard 
index and RBO stands for the Ranked Biased Overlap. The x-axis shows the average percentage for each of the similarity metrics, 
and the y-axis shows the pairs of search engines that are compared. 
 
We observed that language choice led to more substantial variation between the pairs of search 
engines (Figure 4). For several pairs, such as Bing and DuckDuckGo, we found that search results were 
more similar for Russian and Chinese than for English. This pattern, however, was not universal, as shown 
by the results for the “US elections” query (Figure A1 in the Appendix). These observations may be 
explained by different volumes of information in the respective languages processed by the search 
engines. The smaller volume of data in Russian and Chinese may increase the probability of sources 
overlapping. Nonetheless, these language-based discrepancies support our general claim of the lack of 
consistency among search engines. 
 
Methods 
 
Research questions. In our study, we looked at three research questions: 1) How do search engines select 
and prioritize information related to COVID-19? 2) To what degree are the ranking and filtering 
mechanisms within the same search engine influenced by randomization? 3) How much do the above-
mentioned aspects of web search vary depending on the language of the query? 
Data collection. We developed a distributed cloud-based research infrastructure to emulate and track 
the browsing behavior of multiple virtual agents. Using Amazon Elastic Compute Cloud (Amazon EC2), we 
created 100 CentosOS virtual machines with two browsers (Firefox and Chrome) installed on each 
machine. In each browser (the “agent”), we installed two browser extensions: a bot and a tracker. The 
bot emulates browsing behavior by searching terms from a pre-defined list and then navigates through 
the search results. The tracker collects the HTML from each page visited by the bot and sends it to a central 
server, a different machine in which all data are stored. 
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Figure 5. Data collection infrastructure schema 
 
We looked at six search engines—Baidu, Bing, Google, Yahoo, Yandex and DuckDuckGo—and queried 
them for the term “coronavirus” in English, Russian, and Chinese. The choice of the first five search 
engines is attributed to them being the most commonly used worldwide (see Statista 2020), whereas 
DuckDuckGo was chosen because of its focus on privacy (Schofield 2019) that translates into it not using 
users’ personal data to personalize search results (Weinberg, 2012). We chose the word “coronavirus” as 
the most common term used in relation to the ongoing pandemic at the time of data collection (see 
Google Trends (2020)) and the one denoting a broad family of viruses that includes COVID-19. In all cases, 
we used the fixed spelling of the term (i.e., “coronavirus” and not “corona virus”) to prevent query 
discrepancies from influencing the search results. 
We divided all agents into six groups (n=32/33; equally distributed between Chrome and Firefox), each 
of which was assigned to a specific search engine. On February 26, 2020, two weeks before WHO declared 
the coronavirus a pandemic, each agent performed a similar browsing routine consisting of typing, 
clicking, and scrolling actions typical of web search navigation. The length of the routine was kept under 
three minutes to enable the collection of a comparable amount of data (~50 top search results). All agents 
were synchronized to start each query at exactly the same time (i.e., every seven minutes). In the case of 
a network failure, a page refresh was triggered to enable re-synchronization of the agent for the next 
round of queries. 
We also cleaned browser data at the beginning of each round of queries to reduce the influence of 
previous searches on the subsequent ones. First, we removed data that can be accessed by the search 
engine JavaScript, comprising local storage, session storage, and cookies. Second, we removed data that 
can only be accessed by the browser or extensions with advanced privileges (see Table A1 in the Appendix 
for a full list), which included browser history and cache. 
Data analysis. After collecting the data, we used BeautifulSoup (Python) and rvest (R) to extract search 
result URLs from HTML for a given query and to filter nonrelevant URLs (e.g., digital ads). While we 
acknowledge that nonrelevant URLs can also influence the way that users perceive information about the 
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coronavirus, we decided to remove them because of our interest in the default mechanisms for search 
filtering and ranking. 
We then conducted search results between each pair of two agents (200*199/2 = 19900 pairs) using 
two similarity metrics: JI and RBO. JI measures the overlap between two sets of results and can be defined 
as a share of the identical results in both sets among all the unique results. It is frequently used to audit 
search algorithms (Hannak et al., 2013; Kliman-Silver et al., 2015; Puschmann, 2019). The value of JI varies 
between 0 and 1, with 1 indicating that the compared sets are 100% identical and 0 that they are 
completely different. We calculated two JIs for each pair of agents: one measuring the overlap between 
the full sets of search results from each agent and one measuring the overlap for the top 10 results. 
JI usefully assesses how many URLs are repeated within the search results acquired by the agents, but 
it does not account for the order of these URLs. However, source ranking is crucial for auditing search 
algorithms: the composition of two sets of results can be identical (hence, JI = 1), but the order of these 
results can be different, leading to incompatible user experiences. Discrepancies in ranking are particularly 
important because users rarely scroll below the few top results (Cutrell & Guan, 2007; González-Caro & 
Marcos, 2011). 
To account for differences in search result ranking, we used RBO, a metric designed explicitly for 
investigating similarities in the output of search engines (Webber et al., 2010; Cardoso & Magalhães, 2011; 
Robertson et al., 2018). Unlike JI, RBO weights top search results more than lower ones to take into 
account that a source’s ranking influences the probability of the user seeing it (Cutrell & Guan, 2007). 
Similar to JI, an RBO value of 1 indicates that the composition of results and their rankings are 100% 
identical, whereas an RBO value of 0 indicates that both the results and their rankings are completely 
different. 
For RBO, the exact weight of the results’ positioning is determined by the parameter p. The value of the 
parameter is decided by the researcher and can be any number within a 0 < p < 1 range. The lower the 
value of p, the more weight is placed on the top results. We ran our analysis with two different values of 
p: 0.95 and 0.8. The former value enables a more systemic analysis of the ranking differences between 
the two agents, whereas the latter focuses on the variation between the few top results (Webber et al., 
2010, p. 24). 
After calculating similarity metrics, we examined the types of information source prioritized by the 
search engines. Using an inductive coding approach, we examined the 20 most common URLs among 
search results in English for each of the six engines and coded each URL according to the category of 
information source to which it belonged. We identified 10 types of information source: 1) alternative 
media: non-mainstream and niche sources, such as anonymous blogs; 2) commerce: business-related 
sources and online shops; 3) government: sources associated with local and national government 
agencies; 4) healthcare: sources associated with healthcare organizations, such as medical clinics and 
public health institutions; 5) infotainment: sources providing a mix of news and entertainment, such as 
HowStuffWorks; 6) legacy media: sources related to mainstream media organizations, such as CNN; 7) 
non-government organization (NGO): sources attributed to mainstream non-government organizations; 
8) reference work: online reference sources, such as Wikipedia; 9) social media: social media platforms, 
such as Reddit; 10) think tank: sources related to research institutions. The coding was conducted by the 
two authors, who consensus-coded disagreements between them. 
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Appendix 
 
 
Figure 1A. Similarity metrics for the “US elections” query results. JI stands for the Jaccard index and RBO stands for the Ranked 
Biased Overlap. The x-axis shows the average percentage for each of the similarity metrics, and the y-axis shows the pairs of 
search engines that are compared. 
 
 
Browser Data type 
Chrome appcache, cache, cacheStorage, fileSystems, formData, history, indexedDB, pluginData, 
passwords, serviceWorkers, webSQL. For detailed information, see:  
https://developer.chrome.com/extensions/browsingData 
Firefox cache, formData, history, indexedDB, pluginData, passwords. For detailed information, 
see: https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/d 
Table 1. Types of data that were cleaned after each query round 
